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Why Be Fair When You Can Have Welfare?
Anthony D’Amato

Abstract

The Kaplow/Shavell thesis can be simply stated: If courts or legislatures pursue any value other than general public welfare, then welfare is to that extent
diminished. Justice is one of those values that detract from welfare. But so too is
injustice. Hence their entire thesis is a tautology.

WHY BE FAIR WHEN YOU CAN HAVE WELFARE?
Anthony D’Amato

AUTHOR’S NOTE: I wrote the following review of Fairness v. Welfare in April
2001, based on Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell’s book-length article in the
Harvard Law Review. Since then, the book itself has been published, and there
have been several reviews independently reaching some of the same conclusions
I’ve reached. However, the following text has not been changed..

In a preprint of their forthcoming book Fairness v. Welfare, Louis Kaplow
and Steven Shavell assert that any judicial decision or legislative enactment is a
mistake if it is not based on the goal of making every person better off. 1 Hence
every case not explainable by Paretan economic theory is in their view wrongly
decided no matter how “fair” it is to the parties. A judicial decision based on
fairness suboptimal because it may make at least one person worse off and could
even make everyone worse off. The thesis is a shrill one, aided by the style of
reader intimidation that seems to have recently emerged as the result of combining
the presumptuous didacticism of law reviews with the pile-driver prose of
economic analysis.
The Kaplow/Shavell thesis may be summarized as follows. Let W stand for
a policy that has as its goal an increase in everyone’s well being—which, of course,
is the Pareto principle. Thus W is the optimal policy; a person will adopt W if she
wants to increase the welfare of every individual in society. Next, let X be some
policy other than W. Since X is different from W by definition,2 then X must be
less than optimal, also by definition. Therefore under X, at least one person will be
made worse off. This entails the further proposition that a circumstance can exist
in which adopting X will make everyone worse off.3 In this way Kaplow/Shavell
1

Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 961 (2001) [hereinafter
Fairness v. Welfare]. See also Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, The Conflict Between Notions of Fairness
and the Pareto Principle, 1 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 63 (1999); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Notions of
Fairness Versus the Pareto Principle: On the Role of Logical Consistency, 110 Yale L.J. 237 (2000); Louis
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Any Non-Individualistic Social Welfare Function Violates the Pareto Principle,
John L. Olin Center paper (1999)
2
As Kaplow & Shavell define it, “our definition of fairness includes all principles—but only those
principles—that give weight to factors that are independent of individuals’ well-being.” Fairness v.
Welfare, supra n. 364, at 989.
3
Although Kaplow & Shavell offer a formal proof for this proposition (Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell,
Any Non-Individualistic Social Welfare Function Violates the Pareto Principle, John L. Olin Center paper
(1999)), its truth is intuitively obvious. Briefly, ‘some’ is closer to ‘all’ than it is to ‘none.’ For example, if
we say that there is at least one unicorn in Montana, then it is just a matter of contingent truth whether there
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reach their conclusion: that any policy other than W is inferior to W in the sense
that it will make at least one person, perhaps some, and perhaps everyone, worse
off. If we want X to stand for Fairness, for example, then adopting a policy that is
fair will lead to the unwelcome consequence that some people, or maybe everyone,
will be made worse off by X. Hence, considerations of fairness should not
influence the deciding of cases or the enactment of statutes.
The Kaplow/Shavell welfare thesis is of course a version of utilitarianism.
But the authors think they have avoided the classic ‘scapegoat objection’ to
utilitarianism by requiring that the policy should be aimed at making everybody
better off. Under the classic ‘Lee Harvey Oswald’ example of the scapegoat
objection to utilitarianism, a person is framed for a sensational murder in order to
quiet the social unrest that might otherwise follow the public’s realization that the
killer is still at large. While that might make everyone else better off, it would
make at least one person—Oswald—distinctly worse off. However, we can tinker
with the scapegoat objection a bit in order to apply it to the Kaplow/Shavell theory.
Suppose the authorities need someone upon whom to pin the murder. They hire a
starving actor, offer him a lot of money, walk him through all the secret details
about the murder that are known only to the police and the murderer himself, and
put him on trial. Perhaps, if he is a good actor, he will break down at the end of a
grueling cross-examination and admit his guilt. He is convicted and sentenced to
death. He is strapped to the chair where he proceeds to deliver the most
electrifying performance of his career. As soon as the witnesses have left in the
belief that he is dead, he is unstrapped from the chair, led out the back door, and
handed a cashier’s check and a one-way ticket to Bangkok. Under this scenario,
everybody is made better off. The police are happy that their professionalism has
been vindicated—they quickly caught the killer with evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt. The family of the victim feels vindicated—they believe the story. The real
killer is delighted that he has escaped and now has total immunity (the law
enforcement authorities could never afford to arrest him even if an eyewitness
showed up). The actor is happy—he never needs to work again. The public is
happy in their belief that justice has been done. Even Vilfredo Pareto is happy in
that big welfare state in the sky. Hence, the Kaplow/Shavell welfare model,
although ensuring that everyone be made better off, has not avoided the obvious
unfairness associated with the scapegoat objection.
The other classic problem with utilitarianism concerns the computation of
the greatest good for the greatest number. Utilitarianism theory does not solve this
are many unicorns in Montana or even whether all the unicorns in the world are in Montana. But if we say
there is no unicorn in Montana, we are infinitely distant from the proposition that there is at least one
unicorn in Montana. Accordingly, if W is the optimal policy that makes no one worse off, any other policy
Xi is ‘closer’ to Xj than it is to W, where i and j can take on any value from ‘one person being worse off’ to
‘all people being worse off.’ However, it should be noted, without going into great detail here, that the
authors enlist this formal logical result to argue that even in cases where W and X lead to the same result,
W is preferable because X could lead to a result in which everyone is worse off. Fairness v. Welfare, supra
n. 364, at 1012 n102. The authors do not reveal the mechanism (is it intrinsic or extrinsic, for example?)
that would explain why X could lead to such a result..
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problem; rather, it is left up to the wise determination of an impartial spectator.4
No one knows what the qualifications for spectatorship might be, or what
instructions to give the spectator.5 Kaplow and Shavell begin their argument by an
admission:
[A] method of aggregation is of necessity an element of welfare economics,
and value judgments are involved in aggregating different individuals’ wellbeing into a single measure of social welfare.

So far so good, though perhaps they should have voided their own thesis by saying, more
accurately, “unfathomable value judgments.” Nevertheless, they proceed to make their
critical move:
Various methods of aggregation are possible. For example, under the utilitarian
approach, social welfare is taken to be the sum of individuals’ utilities.
Alternatively, the well being of worse-off individuals might be given additional
weight, as under the approach associated with John Rawls, wherein social welfare
corresponds to the utility of the worst-off individuals. In this Article, we do not
defend any specific way of aggregating individuals’ well-being; that is, we do
not endorse any particular view about the proper distribution of well-being
or income.6

The most remarkable word—truly a howler—in this remarkable paragraph is the
word “defend.” Imagine a 400-page proof in a mathematics journal of Fermat’s
Last Theorem in which one of the steps somewhere in the middle of the proof says
‘Now we square the circle. We do not defend any specific way of squaring it.’ In
the same way, Kaplow & Shavell would have us take on faith the existence of a
method of aggregation that they lack the space to defend, considering that they
were only allocated a total of 427 law-review pages (a number that gives a wholly
new meaning to the term ‘article’).
Kaplow & Shavell know that the interpersonal comparison of utilities is
impossible. But they want us to gloss over this inconvenient fact. They want us to
assume that even though a judge cannot measure, quantify or aggregate the utilities
of the two parties standing right in front of him, it is child’s play for the judge to
measure, quantify or aggregate the utilities of 284,000,000 people in the United
States.7 As we have just seen, Kaplow & Shavell tell us that “various methods of
aggregation are possible.” Such as what? The first ‘method’ as quoted above is:
“under the utilitarian approach, social welfare is taken to be the sum of individuals’
utilities.” This is a method? It is nothing more than the very conclusion they’re in
4

The best brief discussion of the role of the spectator in utilitarianism that I have seen is John Rawls, A
Theory of Justice 19-24 (rev. ed. 1999).
5
All we know is that there are at least two qualified spectators: Kaplow and Shavell.
6
Fairness v. Welfare, at 987-88.
7
The resident population of the United States as of March 1, 2001, is 283,707,367. See
http://www,census.gov/cgi-bin/popclock. The Kaplow & Shavell approach to aggregation reminds me of
the story of the accountant who reports to the CEO that the company will lose money on every single
widget that they decide to produce. The CEO replies: “That’s OK, we’ll make it up in volume.”
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the process of begging. Well, let us proceed. They say they have “various
methods.” The word ‘various’ suggests several more methods. However, all they
mention is one more method. Considering the fact that the first method they cited
wasn’t a method at all—summing utilities is the problem, not the solution—this
next one is the sole method that they provide to the reader. It had better be good.
The method, as above quoted, is that “the well-being of worse-off individuals
might be given additional weight, as under the approach associated with John
Rawls, wherein social welfare corresponds to the utility of the worst-off
individuals.” But Rawls never said anything like that. Rawls simply wanted to
transfer money from the best-off to the worst-off, defining the best-off as those who
have the most money and the worst-off as those who have the least money (a
perfectly quantifiable determination). Rawlsian transfer payments have nothing to
do with the utility of individuals. For example, under Rawls’s system you could
conceivably take money from a rich person with the result that her life is made
happier and give it to a poor person making his life miserable. That result would
not count against Rawls’s thesis, because Rawls isn’t talking about utility at all;
he’s talking about social fairness (which in his view relates to the just distribution
of wealth).8 When Kaplow & Shavell title their article Fairness Versus Welfare
and try to convince us that between the two we should choose Welfare and reject
Fairness, how can they possibly enlist Rawls—who would do just the opposite and
choose Fairness while rejecting Welfare—as providing the sole example for their
thesis of aggregating utilities? For them to say that the Rawlsian ‘method’ is
acceptable is like saying, in the course of the proof of Fermat’s Last Theorem, that
one of the various acceptable methods for squaring the circle is to use straightedge
and qumpass. A qumpass is a lot like a compass except it also has the ability to
square circles.
Kaplow & Shavell try to persuade us that things go wrong when a
policymaker’s goals include fairness, justice, morality, or respect for individual
rights.9 But at the same time that they inveigh against these goals, they apparently
fail to come to grips with the fact that their own thesis proves that policymakers
also go wrong when they seek unfairness, injustice, immorality, or disdain for
individual rights. For the selfsame ‘logic’ of the Kaplow & Shavell thesis that
instructs policymakers to reject fairness also instructs them to reject unfairness.
The term ‘X’ in Kaplow & Shavell’s thesis can stand for any goal other than the
goal of making every individual better off. Thus if policymakers following their
prescription were to use X as standing for unfairness, plug it into the theory and
find that it tells them to reject unfairness as suboptimal, then they would be left
with fairness—the very choice the authors are complaining about. In short, the
authors have managed to prove their thesis and its exact opposite at the same time.
Perhaps they should change their title to reflect this fact. I suppose they would turn
8

Not that I agree with Rawls; I criticized his view in one of the earliest and most ignored articles ever
published about Rawls. See Anthony D’Amato, International Law and Rawls’ Theory of Justice, 5 Denver
J. Int’l L. 525 (1975),
9
They say: “Although ‘fairness,’ ‘justice,’ ‘rights,’ and similar terms are often used in different senses, it
will not be necessary to distinguish among them for our purposes.” Fairness v. Welfare, at 969 n.7.
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down the suggestion Unfairness Versus Welfare as something that sounds too much
like a nineteenth-century socialist tract. Even less good for sales, though more
accurate, would be Fairness And Unfairness Versus Welfare. Perhaps the optimal
title that would balance the interests of the academic and commercial markets is:
Batman Meets Welfare Woman and Loses: Cases and Materials.10
The reason that taking fairness into account—or if you will, unfairness—
must lead to policies that fail to make everyone better off, is precisely because
Kaplow/Shavell have defined it to come out that way. Since they define W as the
optimal policy, any other policy X—whether X stands for fairness, unfairness, or
sublime indifference—will perforce be suboptimal. After a mountain of labor (427
pages with 1,047 footnotes), Kaplow & Shavell have brought forth a definition.11
It turns out to be exactly the same definition they started with. At least no one can
say that their article lacks focus. However, one might very well ask: what happens
under their own definition if in a particular case X turns out to be equivalent to W?
Can we then say that X may on occasion be just as good as W? Well, if that
happens, Kaplow & Shavell say in a footnote, the fairness principle “collapses”
into the welfare principle, so presumably we don’t need fairness.12 I confess that
when I read this footnote I was momentarily snowblinded by the chutzpah.
Apparently Kaplow & Shavell’s idiosyncratic variation on a theme by Pareto has
already become the standard for evaluating a concept like fairness that was a mere
five thousand years in the making.
If so far I have been too general in my comments on the Kaplow & Shavell
thesis, I would like to close by giving a few substantive examples of where their
theory might lead anyone who takes it seriously. As I type these words, two major
governmental issues are dominating the media: what to do about former President
Clinton’s eleventh-hour pardons, and how to repay to the American people a $1.6
trillion budget surplus. The Kaplow & Shavell thesis helps us find easy solutions
to everyday social issues like these. All we have to do is cleanse our minds of
fairness, justice, morality, and rights, and instead think of simple and practical
ways of making everybody better off.
Pardongate is the easier of the two. Here my suggestion based on the
Kaplow & Shavell thesis is that presidents and governors should simply sell
pardons. After all, it’s their constitutional perk, and we live in a market economy.
Both the pardoner and the pardonee are made better off. And so is everyone else
because of the tax dollars that are saved on incarceration expenses.
Since judging cases is similarly a constitutional perk, the preceding
principle is readily extendable to the judicial branch. Why shouldn’t a judge be
10

Helpful hint for Kaplow & Shavell: Batman’s famous belt can be used as an example of an acceptable
method of aggravating utilities. Ouch!
11
But along the way Kaplow & Shavell have presented a number of interesting arguments that deserve
specific attention. I have not attacked their article because I think it is trivial; on the contary, I think it is
important.
12
Fairness v. Welfare, at 1010 n.98.
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allowed to offer a convicted defendant the choice of twenty years in prison or a
cash payment to the judge of $100,000? Both judge and defendant are made better
off, and society again saves the incarceration costs. However, because of the
practical problem that many criminal defendants are indigent, the Kaplow &
Shavell theory should encourage judges to be more creative and consider applying
the thesis to civil cases. Suppose a plaintiff who was crippled when hit by the
defendant’s car is awarded $10 million by a jury. On appeal, the lawyer for the
defendant’s insurance company is invited into the judge’s chambers. “As you
know,” the judge says, “corrective justice is a fuzzy concept. All I care about is
striking the right social balance for the future between the freedom to drive safely
and the freedom to run over pedestrians. Your insured, the driver, was clearly
negligent. But negligence should not necessarily be overdeterred. I’m
guesstimating that the appropriate balance can be struck in this case somewhere
between one and ten million dollars.” The insurance attorney replies: “I know
what you’re implying, Your Honor, because I’ve been through this drill before. If
you are willing to reduce the jury’s verdict to one million dollars on the ground that
one million strikes the social balance society needs, our company is prepared to pay
you personally an extra one million. You can think of it as our punitive damages.”
Since the judge could have reduced the verdict to a dollar, the plaintiff is better off
getting a million dollars, the defendant and judge are certainly better off, and the
public feels good that the victim has received that much money. The sole problem
with my scenario is that it is conducted behind closed doors. But perhaps that’s
only a temporary problem; if the Kaplow & Shavell thesis catches on big time, such
deals between losing parties and judges could be made on the record in open court,
soon to be followed by a new law-school course Introduction to Bribery &
Corruption (part of the law-and-economics major).13
There is nothing wrong with selling verdicts and pardons because
Kaplow/Shavell instruct us that wrong is the wrong word—we go wrong when we
think in terms of wrong. Pursuing a policy of fairness can only get you into a mess,
and then you’ll have to read 427 pages to get out of it. Policymakers should give
up all thoughts of being fair to the people they rule. The Kaplow/Shavell thesis
may strike some folks as new and provocative, but I confess to a nagging sense of
déjà vu. Something about the decline and fall of the Roman Empire comes to
mind. The authors inform us on their first page: “This Article will subsequently
appear in book form.” When their article does appear in the form of a book, I hope
13

Here’s a Posnerian-type suggestion for class discussion in this new course: Would it make sense for
juries to begin awarding damages of one penny in tort cases? Since there is no room between one penny
and zero, there will be nothing for the judge to skim. The judge will be forced to raise the jury’s damage
award in order to bring it up to the social balancing point. Since this judicial increase would be entirely
unwelcome to the defendant, the defendant would have no incentive to pay any additional money in bribery
charges. (Why?) Suppose the judge retaliates by threatening to add $X to the amount by which he will
raise the jury’s verdict and then offers the defendant a deal to lower it by $Y (which is less than $X) if the
defendant pays an amount of one-half $Y to the judge directly. If the defendant refuses this offer, what can
the judge do? If the judge makes good on his threat, then won’t the plaintiff demand the full amount,
leaving the judge nothing? I offer this suggestion out of a suboptimal sense of fairness to Kaplow &
Shavell so that their thesis might not lead to quite the intellectually stultifying consequence for law-school
teaching than it may otherwise appear to require.
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for the sake of making Kaplow & Shavell better off that a bold announcement will
appear across the front cover: Soon to Be a Major Motion Picture.14
The issue of the $1.6 trillion budget surplus allows us to look more deeply
into what Kaplow/Shavell mean by fairness. But first for my solution: I propose
that the problem of the budget surplus can be solved by drawing up a list of the
1,500 most influential political officials in the country—the President, the Cabinet
officers, all Senators and Representatives, all the judges on the Supreme Court and
the federal courts of appeals, all the state governors and lieutenant governors, and
political hangers-on, stopping at 1,500. Then pay each of these persons one billion
dollars in cash. Deducting the total of these payments from the budget surplus of
$1.6 trillion leaves us with a remainder of $100 billion. Since we have to make
everyone in the United States better off, we do so by paying the remainder out in
$350 checks to each man, woman, and child. My scheme is of course pragmatic: it
should not be too hard convincing 1,500 politicians that this plan comports with
their rational self-interest, so long as Kaplow/Shavell have convinced the American
people that any policy based on fairness is public enemy number one.
However, Kaplow/Shavell could reply to the budget-surplus example as
follows: an individual recipient of a $350 check might have a taste for fairness that
is worth more to her than $350.15 If she finds my budget-surplus distribution
scheme that unfair, then she has not been made better off, and so my scheme is
defeated. At first blush, this reply’s willingness to reintroduce fairness as a
criterion makes it appear that the authors have kicked fairness out the front door
only to allow it to reenter through the back door. What about their claim that a
taste preference for fairness is not conceptual but rather empirical? As they put it,
“the welfare economic significance of a notion of fairness depends directly on the
strength of individuals’ actual tastes for it and is thus an entirely empirical issue.”16
This claim is hollow unless the authors can propose or show a way of measuring
individuals’ actual tastes for fairness. They support their claim by handing the
reader a promissory footnote: “We comment on ways to measure such tastes in [a
later subsection of the article].”17 Flipping some 375 pages ahead, we encounter
the subsection referred to, and find that they have literally delivered on their
promise: they do comment on ways to measure the taste for fairness. Stating that
the measurements are best left to “statisticians and opinion researchers,”18 their
comments range from concluding that opinion research “will often have limited
value” to concluding that polling information is notable for its “unreliability.”19
These comments are all the reader receives about “opinion researchers” who, with
14

With Madonna in the role of Chairperson of the White House Council of Economic Advisers.
As the authors put it: “[I]f individuals have internalized a social norm that is related to a notion of
fairness, they may have a taste for fairness, in the sense that they may feel better off or worse off depending
on whether their conception of fairness is reflected in legal rules or in the actual operation of the legal
system.” Fairness v. Welfare, at 974-755.
16
Id. at 975.
17
Id. at 975 n.24.
18
Id. at 1350.
19
Id. at 1351.
15
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the exception of “statisticians,” are the persons best able to measure tastes for
fairness. As for statisticians, the authors drop them without the benefit of their
comment. Perhaps no comment is possible; after all, statisticians can only come
into the picture after someone else has done the individual measurements. The
reader is left with the impression that this is just another example in the Kaplow &
Shavell article of solving critical issues by straightedge and qumpass.
It could be quite difficult for anyone to prove that any recipient of $350
really values social fairness more than that amount. Most people will say they do if
you ask them, but how can any opinion researcher be sure that they are providing a
precisely accurate introspective measurement of their feelings? If you were to
approach any number of the several million citizens who dodge their income taxes
every year and tell them that you are an opinion researcher anxious to know why
they behave the way they do, they are most likely to tell you that income taxes are
brutally unfair and they are engaged in acts of effective civil protest. But how can
we be sure empirically that it is their taste for fairness that outweighs the risk of
getting caught?
An easier example to discharge my burden of proof on this argument is the
Lee Harvey Oswald ‘scapegoat’ scenario I suggested earlier. Recall that this
example resulted in everyone being made better off. Thus there cannot be any
doubt that the example coheres with the utilitarian foundations of welfare theory
without the embarrassment of the scapegoat problem. But now I want to make a
small addition to that scenario to show that fairness is more fundamental than
welfare and in fact trumps welfare. Suppose a few weeks later an investigative
reporter reveals the police conspiracy to the public—through convincing videotape
evidence including interviews with the actor in Bangkok showing a copy of the
check he received for his services, and interviews of several police officials who
were in on the plan and now ‘regret’ what they have done. Is there any doubt
whatsoever of the public’s reaction? Would any prominent academic or judicial
utilitarian be willing to appear on one of the ubiquitous talking-head news shows to
defend what the police did on the ground that it was important for the general good
of society to lie to the American people?
The ‘scapegoat’ example is at bottom a case where full disclosure triumphs
over Kaplow and Shavell’s welfare-statism. The welfare-seeking policymaker or
judicial lawmaker very often has to hide from the public the real facts and
considerations that influence his decisions. There is something inherently
surreptitious about making rules for the general public that violate fundamental
fairness. The judicial welfarist must conceal from the litigants the fact that he is
inventing new law at their expense (or at least at the expense of the designated
loser) in order to provide for the general welfare (as the judge sees it).
Kaplow and Shavell have created a kind of miniature welfare world, like the
water-filled globe paperweights sold at Christmas that you overturn and snowflakes
descend upon a sleepy little town. Their miniature world is self-contained, selfconsistent, and self-defined, but it is not the real world. Indeed, it is a fake world
8
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that owes its novelty to illusion-making. The very internal consistency of their
model isolates it. Their model does not ‘plug in’ to the real world, and hence
Kaplow/Shavell must argue strenuously—but ultimately to no avail—that
policymakers in the real world ought to conform themselves to the surreptitious
processes of their make-believe welfare world. To the extent that they have made
their argument consistent, they have made it irrelevant.
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